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RIGHT OF ADOPTED CHILDREN TO TAKE
UNDER ANTI-LAPSE STATUTES
A TESTATOR bequeaths a legacy to his son and his residuary estate to
other blood relatives. His son predeceases him, leaving an adopted
child as his only heir. A statute in the jurisdiction provides that a
legacy to a predeceased relative of a testator will not lapse, but will
pass instead to the "issue" of the deceased beneficiary. This fact situa-
tion presents a question on which the courts have long disagreed:1
Does the adopted child qualify as "issue" within the statute, or does the
legacy pass to the blood relatives or other takers of the residuary estate?
The problem brings two practical policies into sharp conflict. If the
adopted child can take his parent's share in a legacy or devise under
an anti-lapse statute, childless persons may adopt children in order to
prevent blood relatives from receiving property which perhaps should
rightfully remain in the blood line.2 On the other hand, if the adoptive
parent lives one day longer than the testator and then dies intestate,
the adopted child takes the property as his heir, and consequently there
is no valid reason to prevent the child from taking under the anti-lapse
statute if the beneficiary happens to predecease the testator.3
The present trend, both in the legislatures and in the courts, has
been to give increasingly broad rights of inheritance to adopted children.
HISTORY OF ADOPTION STATUTES
The English common law did not recognize adoption.4 Rather, the
passage of property from generation to generation was tied closely to
See 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1425 ( 3d ed. 194); Comment, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 81, 8S
(1936). For an excellent, although somewhat outdated discussion of the rights of
adopted children in this and related areas see Oler, Construction of Private Instruments
Where Adopted Children .4re Concerned (pts. 1-z), 43 MICH. L. REv. 705, 901
('945).
-See In the Matter of the Estate of Martin, 133 Misc. 80, 83, 230 N.Y. Supp. 734,
737 (928)-
'See In the Matter of the Estate of Walter, 270 N.Y. 201, 205, 2oo N.E. 786,
787 (1936)5 In the Matter of the Estate of Foster, io8 Misc. 6o4, 6o9, 177 N.Y.
Supp. 827, 830 (1919).
A2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 399 (2d ed. 1898).
The continental custom of "mantle-children" evidently was practiced occasionally until
it was rejected by the court of Henry I. This custom permitted parents to adopt on
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blood lines. Thus, in the middle of the thirteenth century, Bracton
wrote:
Likewise the right [of inheritance] descends to the true heir, . . . for God
alone makes an heir, and because the heir is called from the inheritance, and
not the inheritance from the heir.'
The civil law countries, however, permitted adoption under a system
derived from the ancient Greeks and Romans.6
There were no provisions for adoption by judicial proceedings in
the United States until 185i, when Massachusetts enacted the first
general adoption statute.7 The Massachusetts act gave adopted children
the same rights they would have had if born to the adopting parents
in lawful wedlock, "saving only that such child shall not be deemed
capable of taking property expressly limited to the heirs of the body
or bodies of such petitioner or petitioners [adopting parents]."s This
proviso, copied in many of the adoption statutes of other states,9
reflected the reluctance on the part of the legislatures to include
adopted children in the blood line of the adoptive parents.
Legislatures, however, gradually began to invest adopted children
with more of the rights of natural children. As early as 1895, North
Dakota replaced a provision that adoption itself should not constitute
a child the heir of the adoptive parents"0 with a clause stating that the
adopted child shall be the "same as if born to them [the adoptive
parents] in lawful wedlock."" In 1917 Pennsylvania enacted a
statute which provided that an adopted child could inherit "from
and through" his adoptive parents.'
The history of the New York adoption statute reflects the changing
attitude of the legislatures through the years, although it does not at
the present time give as broad rights as do the majority of states. The
first New York adoption statute was enacted in I873,2 but adopted
the occasion of their marriage any pre-existing offspring. The parents and any children
were placed under a cloak during the marriage ceremony and thus the offspring became
"mantle-children2 Id. at 397-
BR.ACrON, I DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, LIBRI QUINQUE 497-98
(1878).
i AM. JUR. Adoption of Children § 3 (1936) 5 1 C.J. Adoplion of Children § z(1914).
'Mass. Acts & Resolves 1851, ch. 324.
8Id. at § 6.
9E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. s8, § 4o (1954) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461:6
(955).
"'N.D. Laws 1895, ch. 4, § 6.
"
1N.D. REV. CODE § 2804 (1895).
a'Pa. Laws 1917, no. 192, § 16(b).
13N.Y. Sess. Laws 1873, ch. 830.
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children were not able to inherit from their adoptive parents until
i887,14 and the heirs of an adopted child did not receive this right
until I896." In 1938, adopted children and natural children were
granted all the rights of the family relationship, including the right of
inheritance.16 The present statute establishes the legal relation of
parent and child between an adopted child and his adoptive parents,
including the rights of inheritance from each other, but it provides
that as to the passing of property dependent on the foster parent dying
without heirs, "the foster child is not deemed the child of the foster
parent so as to defeat the rights of remaindermen. 17
Most of the states recently have re-considered their adoption laws,
and a majority purport to give an adopted child the same legal rights
as natural children or as if born to the adoptive parents in lawful
wedlocl s while a large number permit a child to inherit from and
through his adoptive parents.19 Many of these statutes have been
enacted within the past ten years, 0 and although a substantial number
of states are still hesitant to grant a child the legal status of blood
relative of the entire adoptive family, the trend is dearly toward giving
the adopted child rights equal to those of natural children.
CLASSIFICATION OF ANTI-LAPsE AND ADOPTION STATUTES
The purpose of anti-lapse statutes, which have been enacted in nearly
all jurisdictions," is to make provision for certain relatives of a testator
'N.Y. Sess. Laws 1887, ch. 703. However, the natural parents retained rights to
the adopted child and his property until x9o9, N.Y. Laws 19o9, ch. xg, and even today
the child is permitted to inherit from his natural parents, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117.
" N.Y. Sess. Laws 1896, ch. 272, § 64. "'N.Y. Sess. Laws 1938, ch. 6o6, § zS.
2 N.Y. DOM. RE.L. LAW § 1 x7. This statute was re-enacted without change in
x961.
"E.g., Ky. RFv. STAT. § 199.52o(.) (196o), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-3 oB (196o),
N.D. CENTURY CODE ANN. § 14-11-13 (196o).
29E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 257, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (Supp. z961). In a
state with an adoption statute like this, there should be no question but that an adopted
child takes under an anti-lapse statute, since this is closely analogous to his inheriting
through an adoptive parent. See text accompanying note 39 infra.
'oTwenty-six states have enacted statutes similar to the two types mentioned within
-the past ten years. This trend reflects a great shift of authority. In 1933 Professor
Mechem wrote concerning anti-lapse statutes: "Where adoption is involved, the cases
are not in harmony. Courts in general, with a respect for 'the blood' hardly to be
paralleled outside of eighteenth century literature, take the view that kinship (at least
for the purposes of succession) is created only as between the parties to the adoption."
Mechem, Some Problems .4rising Under Anti-Latse Statutes, 19 IOWA L. REV. x, £
(1933).
Statutory research indicates only four states which do not have anti-lapse statutes:
Hawaii, Louisiana, New Mexico and Wyoming.
[Vol. 1962:558S
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to whom he presumably would have made a legacy or devise had he
known that one of his beneficiaries had predeceased him."2  These laws
generally state that if a beneficiary with a certain relationship to the
testator should predecease him, then the issue of descendants of the
beneficiary take the share he would have taken had he survived.
Whether an adopted child will qualify under an anti-lapse statute
generally depends upon the interpretation of that statute in conjunction
with the state's adoption statute.'
A majority of anti-lapse statutes require that a person be the "issue"
of the deceased beneficiary in order to prevent lapse.24 The word
"issue" historically has connoted a blood relationship,25 a notion which
has given the courts some difficulty.26 Other statutes state that the
person daiming the deceased beneficiary's share must be a "descendant"
or "lineal descendant" of the beneficiary2 The implication of a blood
connection is difficult to overcome under these statutes also,28 but here
22 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1422 at 176 ( 3 d ed. 1941).
"Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 55, 68 N.E.zd 75, 78 (1946).
2"There are twenty-two statutes with this requirement. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 152-5-1- (953)5 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-176 (1960) 5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 2313 (953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-110 (i96i); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-812
(x959); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-615 (x949) Ky. REV. STAT. § 394.400
(1960); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 19-, § 22 (1955)5 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 7o2.11
(1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.203 (1947); N~s. REV. STAT. § 30-228.03
(1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42.1 (Supp. 1961); N.D. CENTURY CODE ANN.
§ 56-04-20 (196o); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.52 (1954)i PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § i8o.14(8) (195o)j R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-6-i9 (1956)i S.C. CODE
§ 19-237 (i952); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-306 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. I4,
§ 558 (958) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 64-64 (1950) W.VA. CODE ANN. § 4054 (1961) ;
WS. STAT. § 238.13 (1957).
" See In re Miller's Trust, 133 Mont. 354, 356-58, 323 P.2d 885, 886-87 (958) ;
In re Semon's Will, 195 Misc. 938, 940, 91 N.Y.S.zd 203, 2o6 (1949). See also 4
PAGE, WILLS § 34.22 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961).
"See, e.g., Arnold v. Helmer, 327 Mass. 722, 1oo N.E.2d 886 (195 i ) (adopted
child is not issue), In re Miller's Trust, 133 Mont. 354, 323 P.2d 885 (1958)
(adopted child is not issue), Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N.E.2d 75 (946)
(adopted child is issue).
" Fifteen statutes have this wording. ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 59-4-3
(1949); CAL. PROB. CODE § 92; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.20 (Supp. 196)5 IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 14-323 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 49 (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 6-6oi(g)(2) (1953); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 169, § to (1954);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.460 (1956); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-139 (1949);
NET. REV. STAT. § 133-200 (Supp. i96o); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 142 (1952);
ORE. RFV. STAT. § 114.240 (Supp. 1957); S.D. CODE § 56-0232 (1939); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 74-1-35 (1953) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.110 (Supp. 1959).
""The word 'descendants' connotes those persons who are in the blood stream of
the ancestor." In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 142, 13 So. 2d 904, 907 (1943).
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the courts seem to have accomplished the task with more facility than
in the "issue" jurisdictions.29  A few states require that the petitioner
be a "child" of the legatee,30 and two provide that he must be an
"heir."131  In these states, an adopted child will prevent lapse, since all
states provide that an adopted person is the child and heir of his
adopting parents.3 -
Maryland has by far the broadest anti-lapse statute. It provides
that if any devisee or legatee shall predecease the testator, then the
devise or legacy shall have the same effect "as if such devisee or legatee
had survived the testator."35 Adopted children dearly prevent lapse
under the Maryland statute, as it is well-settled that they are heirs of
their adoptive parents.
The statutes of three states specifically provide that adopted children
prevent lapse. The Indiana anti-lapse statute reads: "The word
'descendant'... shall include children adopted during minority by the
testator and by his descendants .... 13" Arkansas 5 and Pennsylvania30
have similar provisions which include all persons, whether or not adopted
during minority.
A few other states have statutes which define the words "issue,"
A descendant has also been defined as "a person who proceeds from the body of an-
other... ." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4 th ed. 195i).
" See, e.g., In re Moore's Estate, 7 Cal. App. 2d 722, 47 P.2d 533 (1935); Hoel-
linger v. Molzhon, 77 N.D. ioS, 41 N.W.2d 217 (i95o). But see, In re Hewett's
Estate, 153 Fla. '37, 13 So. 2d 904 ('943).
"
5There are seven statutes of this type. ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 16 (196o) ; ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 6o-4o(b) (Supp. 196i); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-133 (1956);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 660 (1957); N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A:3-13 (1953); N.Y. DECED.
EsT. LAW § 29; TEx. PROB. CODE § 68 (x956).
81 10WA CODE ANN. § 633.16 (2946); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:12 (s9S5)
(heir in the descending line).
52 Since there was no adoption under the common law, an adopted child can in-
herit from his adopting parents only if the adoption statute so provides. z CJ.S.
Aldoption of Children § 63(a) (1936). See also I Am. JuR. Adoption of Children § 59
(1936). Statutory research indicates that all states permit an adopted child to inherit
from his adopting parents.
5 5MD. ANN. CODE art. 93 § 354. (957).
5 IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-6oi (g) (2) (1953).
5 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6o-4o(b) (Supp. 1961). This statute reads: If "such
devisee shall die in the lifetime of the testator, leaving a child, natural or adopted,
such devise shall not lapse... 1
55 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § i8o.14(6) (Supp. x961). This statute states: "In
construing clauses (8), (9), and (so) of this section, relating to lapsed and void
devises and legacies, ...any person adopted before the death of the testator shall be
considered the child of his adopting parent .... "
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"descendants," or "child" to include adopted children."1 These statutes,
read in conjunction with the anti-lapse statutes, make it dear that an
adopted child will prevent lapse.3"
In most jurisdictions, however, it is necessary to examine the rela-
tionship established by the adoption statute to determine whether an
adopted child can qualify as "issue" or "lineal descendant" under the
anti-lapse statute. Adoption statutes fall into four general classifications.
"From and Through" Statutes
"From and through" statutes provide broadly that adopted children
are to inherit through as well as from their adoptive parents. These
statutes, of which the California act is typical, generally state that an
adopted child is to be treated in all respects as a natural child of the
adoptive parents. The California Probate Code provides: "An adopted
child shall be deemed a descendant of one who has adopted him, the
same as a natural child, for all purposes of succession by, from or
through the adopting parent the same as a natural parent." 39 A common
variation of this provision is found in the Delaware statute, which gives
an adopted child "the right to inherit from its adoptive parent or
parents and from the collateral or lineal relatives of such adoptive
parent or parents .... 0
A child adopted under a statute of this type dearly should prevent
lapse of a legacy or devise, since the legislature undoubtedly intended
to include adopted children in the blood line of the adoptive family.
The legislatures only recently have begun to break away from the
traditional notion that adopting parents should not be allowed to force
on their other kindred a relationship with the adopted child. Of the
twenty-one4' "from and through" statutes in effect in the United States
17 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-65a (x96o); D.C. CODE ANN. § r6-224
(196x); TEx. PROB. CODE § 3 (b) (sg6); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.020 (Supp.
19s6).
" For example, the Connecticut anti-lapse statutes states that if a child, grandchild,
brother or sister of the testator predeceases him, then "the issue of such devisee or
legatee shall take the estate so devised or bequeathed," CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-176 (.96o), and another Connecticut statute provides that the word "Issue"
includes adopted persons, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-65a (396o).
"0 CAL. PROB. CODE § 257-
'
0 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 9 20(b) (1953).
" CAL. PROB. CODE § 257; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-65 (396o) ; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 920 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-227 (396!); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 3, § 14 (Smith-Hurd 196 ) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 78 (Supp. 396); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS § 730.9 (Supp. 3956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (1959); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 1269-o6 (Supp. 196o ) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453-090 (952); NEB. REV. STAT.
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today, seventeen 42 have been enacted since 1950.
"Natural Children" Statutes
Another class of statutes purports to give an adopted child all the
rights of a natural child born in lawful wedlock, but do not expressly
provide for inheritance through the adoptive parents from other lineal
or collateral kindred.43  Arguably these statutes render the child the
"natural child" of the adopting parents only, and not the natural
kindred of other relatives of the adopting parents. However, when the
adoption statutes are construed in conjunction with their respective
anti-lapse statutes, it is evident that in most of these states an adopted
child probably would prevent lapse. For example, the Alaska44 and
Washington45 adoption statutes make an adopted child the issue of his
adopters, and the anti-lapse statutes46 require that a person be a lineal
descendant of the beneficiary in order to prevent lapse. It would be
difficult to construct a plausible argument that one who is issue of an-
other person is not also his lineal descendant.
These statutes also are relatively recent. Nine4 ' of the seventeen48
"natural child" statutes have been enacted since 1950.
§ 43-110 (196o); NEv. REv. STAT. § 127.i6o (Supp. 1959); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 48-23 (Supp. i961); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. ,o, § 6o.16(i) (Supp. 196,); ORE.
REv. STAT. § 109.O4. (Supp. 196i), § 1I1.zo (Supp. 1957) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ x.8 (1950); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-7-16 (1956); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 46a(9) (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 63-358 (Supp. 196o); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 4759 (96i)i WIs. STAT. § 48.92 (1957).
"The four states which have statutes enacted before 195o are Delaware (1935),
Missouri ('947), Nebraska (,943)
, 
and Pennsylvania (1917).
"Although the wording of these statutes varies considerably, the Kentucky act is
a good example. It provides that an adopted child "shall be considered for purposes
of inheritance and succession and for all other legal considerations, the natural, legiti-
mate child of the parents adopting it the same as if born of their bodies." Ky. REV.
STAT. 199.520(2) (196o).
"ALASKA COMPi.LAWS ANN. § 21-3-21 0949)-
"WASH. REv. CODE § 26.32.140 (Supp. 1959).
"ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 59-4-3 (1949); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.11.1to
(Supp. 1959).
"Alabama (1956), Arizona (Y952), Colorado (1953), Florida (x953), Hawaii
"(1953), Kentucky (1956), New Jersey (1953), South Carolina (19S4), and Wash-
ington (.9s5).
"A.A. CODE tit. 27, § 5 (Supp. 1959); ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 21-3-1
(1949); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-io8 (Supp. 1961); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-109
(i947); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-2-4 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 72.22, 731.30
(Supp. 196); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-414 (Supp. 1961); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 331-16
(1955) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-121 (1953) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 6oo.6 (1946) ; KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2103 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.520(2) (196o); NJ.
REv. STAT. § 9 :3-3oB (196o); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2-1o, 29-1-17 (1953); N.D.
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"Parent-Child" Statutes
A few statutes merely establish the legal relation of parent and
child between the adopting parent and the child, and contain no state-
ment of policy intended to further equate such children with natural
children.49 Since the statute does not purport to make an adopted child
a member of the entire adoptive family, it is doubtful that an adopted
child will prevent lapse under this type of statute. Only five states
have adoption statutes of this nature, and none have been passed since
I945."
"Limitation" Statutes
Statutes in eight jurisdictions juxtapose some limitation on the
inheritance rights of adopted children created by provisions of the
types discussed above.6' The Louisiana act, for example, states that "as
between the adopted and his lawful issue, and the blood relatives of the
adopter, no legal relationship whatsover shall arise.... Y5  Four other
states prohibit an adopted child from taking property expressly limited
to heirs of the body of the adopting parent.53
The decisions are conflicting in "limitation" states as to the right of
an adopted child to take under an anti-lapse statute.54 This can be
explained by the variations in the other clauses of the adoption acts,
Which range from the "parent-child" relationship established by the
CENTURY CODE ANN. § 14-11-13 (196o); S.C. CODE § Ig-52.11 (Supp. 196o) ; WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.32.140 (Supp. 1958).
" The Utah act is typical of this type of statute; it reads: "after adoption the two
[adopting parent and adopted child] shall sustain the legal relation of parent and child,
and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that relation." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-30-10 (1953).
50 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1507 (Supp. 1961), § x6-x5o8 (1948); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 61-134 (1947) [S.D. CODE § 14-0407] (Supp. 196o); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-30-10 (1953)5 [Wyo. COmP. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-712, 1-721 (1945M
"
1 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 214.2 (Supp. 1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 150,
§ 40 (1954)i MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 2io, § 7 (1955)i N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 461:6 (x9s5); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117 (1957); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3107.13 (196o); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-126 (Supp. 1961); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
,5, § 448 (1958).
"LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 214.2 (Supp. 1955).
" ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. x58, § 40 (1954); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 461:6
(1955); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (196o); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448
(.958).
" Compare Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 At1. 948 (x89z) (prevents
lapse), 'wilh Gammons v. Gammons, iz± Mass. 454, 99 N.E. 95 (19x1) (does not
prevent lapse).
Vol. *96z: 558]
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New York statute5 5 to the broad "from and through" provisions in
the Ohio act.P8
These limitations have been retained from early adoption statutes.
As has been noted, the new adoption laws are generally liberal5 as more
legislatures re-evaluate their adoption statutes, greater inheritance
rights for adopted children can be anticipated.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
The courts have been more generous in granting inheritance rights
to adopted children than have the legislatures, although the specific
problem of whether an adopted child will prevent lapse of a legacy or
devise has not been passed on in all jurisdictions. A majority of the
courts which have considered the question now hold that an adopted
child will prevent lapse. The reasoning by which the courts have
arrived at this conclusion, however, varies as greatly as the statutes
under which the decisions are made.
One approach taken by the courts has been to distinguish anti-lapse
statutes from inheritance laws and thus hold that since restrictions in
adoption statutes generally are related to the child's right to "inherit"
and not to his right to take under a will, these limitations are immaterial
when an anti-lapse statute is involved. The leading case is Warren v.
Prescott,= an 1892 Maine decision which has only recently gained a
large following. The court, deciding the case under a "limitation"
statute,58 explained this distinction:
In such a case, a child born in lawful wedlock does not "inherit" the
devise or legacy from his parents' kindred. One who takes under a will
does not "inherit." . . . He takes as a lineal descendant of the legatee, by
force of the statute. 9
"'Naw YORK DOM. REL. LAW § xis. This statute provides: "The foster parents
or parent and the foster child shall sustain toward each other the legal relation of
parent and child and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that
relation including the rights of inheritance from each other."
"
8 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (196o). This statutes reads: ... a legally
.adopted child shall have the same status and rights, and shall bear the same legal
relationship to the adopting parents as if born to them in lawful wedlock...
'5 84 Me. 483, 24 Atl. 948 (1892).
38 Me. Laws IS8o, ch. 183.
Z Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 487, 24 At. 948, 949 (1892), which held
that since the limitations in the adoption statute related to the child's right to "inherit"
and not to his right to take under a will, an adopted child could take under the
anti-lapse statute, which was distinguished from the inheritance laws because it did
not involve intestacy.
(Vol. 1962: 558
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This is a fine distinction, and it is questionable whether it is intellectually
sound as stated by the Maine court. Inheritance is entirely statuatory,
and it too amounts to no more than taking as a relative of the intestate
by force of the statute.
An Illinois court, in In re Harmount's Estate,6 ° somewhat clarified
the distinction which the Maine court was attempting to articulate. The
court stated:
[T] he adopted children are not seeking to take property from the mother of
their adoptive father but are seeking to take as substituted legatees that share
which had been given by will to their adopting father.... While it is true
that the children are seeking to take property which had its origin in the
estate of the adopting father's deceased ancestor, the adopted children are
taking by virtue of a statute which creates in them an original right by virtue
of their substitution for the legatee who predeceased the testatrix.61
There the anti-lapse statute was viewed not as a statute of descent, but
rather as a statute which narrows the circumstances under which a
legacy or devise will lapse.62 This rationale, while effective in reaching
an equitable result, approaches the problem by the back door and does
not really elucidate the rights of an adopted child.
The North Dakota court, in Hoellinger v. Molzhon, 3 approached
the problem from the standpoint of the policies the statutes are intended
to serve. The court found that the legislative purpose of the anti-lapse
statute was to prevent hardships caused by the virtual disinheritance of
children when a legacy or devise lapsed." The court then held that
the adoption law, a "natural child" statute, was intended to grant all
children equal inheritance rights whether they came into the line of
descent by birth or by adoption."5 Considering the purposes of the two
statutes together, the court found it evident that adopted children
should prevent lapse. This reasoning could also be applied to a "parent-
child" statute, since hardships created by the lapse of a legacy or devise
are as great when the adopted person is just a "child" of the adopting
80 336 Ill. App. 322, 83 N.E.zd 756 (1949).
"Id. at 325-26, 83 N.E.2d at 758. (Emphasis added.)
" Id. at 326, 83 N.E.zd at 758.
8577 N.D. io8, 4.1 N.W.2d 27 (2950).
"Id. at xx, 41 N.W.zd at 219.
e5Id. at x15, 41 N.W.2d at 222. The court stated, "the adoption creates the same
rights of heirship in the adopted child as in the child of the body. The ordinary mean-
ing of 'lineal descendant' therefore, does not apply here." Id. at 112, 41 N.W.2d
at 220.
568 DUKE LAW JOURN1L [Vol. ,962: S58
parent as when he is a "natural child." By analogous reasoning the
same result could obtain under a "limitation" statute.66
In 1961 the North Carolina Supreme Court held, in Headen v.
Jackson,7 that an adopted child prevents lapse under that state's
"from and through" statute6" and approved a simple test for arriving
at that result.
Whatever the problem is concerning an adopted child, his standing and his
legal rights can be measured by this clear test: "What would his standing and
his rights be if he had been born to his adoptive parents at the time of the
adoption? "6
This test is easy to apply and can readily be utilized in solving problems
which arise under any of the "from and through" or "natural child"
statutes. It is by far the best solution to the problem of the status of
adopted children under anti-lapse statutes. Unfortunately, the test
does not solve anti-lapse problems under "parent-child" or "limitation"
statutes.
The New York courts have struggled with the anti-lapse problem
under a "limitation" statute70 for years, and have reached conflicting
results. In 199 a lower New York court held that an adopted child
would prevent lapse, stating that the legislature had intended that an
adopted child take under the anti-lapse statute.7' In 1928, however,
the New York Appellate Division aflirmed In the Matter of Estate of
Martin,"2 where the lower court had held that as a matter of public
"8 The court could examine the policies behind both the anti-lapse statute and the
adoption statute. In a "limitation" state these statutes would probably be found to
conflict and the court would have to make a choice between the two. By finding that
the policy of preventing hardship to children of deceased beneficiaries was stronger
than the policy of keeping property in the blood line, the court could reach the con-
clusion that adopted children should prevent lapse under a "limitation" statute.
OT 255 N.C. 157, 120 S.E.2d 598 (ig6). 4ccord, In re Holcombe's Estate, 259
Wis. 642, 49 N.W.zd 914 ('95').
08N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (Supp. sg6x).
Go 255 N.C. 157, z59, i~o S.E.zd 598, 599-600 (g6s). The court quoted from
,4doption of Minors, .4 Survey of Statutory Changes -in North Carolina in 1955-
'Adoption of Minors, 33 N.C.L. REV. 521, 522 (1955).
70N.Y. DoM. Ras.. LAW § 117.
"In the Matter of the Estate of Foster, xo8 Misc. 604, 177 N.Y. Supp. 827
(Surr. Ct. igig). The court reasoned that the right to take property on the death
of an ancestor is not an inherent right, but a statutory one. Id. at 61l, 177 N.Y.
Supp. at 832.
'2224 App. Div. 873, 23o N.Y. Supp. 873 (5928), afirming 133 Misc. 80, 230
N.Y. Supp. 734 (Surr. Ct. 1928).
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policy, an adopted child could not prevent lapse.73 The lower court
said that it would be deleterious to public policy if an adopted child,
perhaps unknown to the testator, could defeat the testator's intent in
making a disposition of his property.74  In 193 5 a lower New York
court held, without expressly overruling the Martin case,7" that an
adopted child prevented lapse,7 '6 and one year later the New York
Court of Appeals, expressly overruling the Martin case, held that an
adopted child was the "child" of his foster parents within the meaning
of the anti-lapse statute. New York law, which now appears to be
settled, has supplied the most practical reasoning for the solution of
this problem. Their courts have pointed out that since an adopted child
would have taken the property had the beneficiary outlived the testator
by even a day, there is no reason to let a legacy or devise lapse merely
because the beneficiary happens to predecease the testator.78
Several states, however, still hold that an adopted child will not
prevent lapse. Massachusetts has consistently held that under its limita-
tion statute a legacy or devise lapses if a beneficiary is survived only by
an adopted child. In Arnold v. Helmer,79 the court stated that
the statute created a relationship between the child and the adopting
parents but did not intend "to force that relationship or its consequences
upon other kindred.""0  In Rauc v. Metz,8" a Missouri court refused
to permit an adopted daughter to take a legacy bequeathed to her
deceased adoptive mother, holding that the "blood of a testator was
78 133 Misc. 8o, 83, 230 N.Y. Supp. 734, 737 (Surr. Ct. 1928).
7 Ibid.
" In the Matter of the Estate of Horvath, 155 Misc. 734, 737-38, 279 N.Y. Supp.
189, 193 (Surr. Ct. 1935). Here the court stated that the Martin case was incorrect
and appeared to have been overruled already in Matter of Horn, 256 N.Y. 294, 176
N.E. 399 (1931). The Horn case, however, merely held that an adopted child could
take under a will leaving property to the children of the beneficiaries in the event that
the beneficiaries should predecease the testator, and the court did not even mention
the Martin case.
" In the Matter of the Estate of Horvath, supra note 82.
"In the Matter of the Estate of Walter, 270 N.Y. zo, 2oo N.E. 786 (1936).
The court quoted In the Matter of the Estate of Cook, 187 N.Y. 253, 261, 79 N.E.
991, 994- (1907): "In the eye of the law, therefore, adopted children are lineal
descendants of their foster parent. They are in the line of descent from him through
the command of the statute, the same as if that line had been established by nature."
In the Matter of the Estate of Walter, supra at 204, 2oo N.E. at 787.
"8 In the Matter of the Estate of Walter, supra note 84 at 205, 200 N.E. at 787;
In the Matter of the Estate of Foster, xo8 Misc. 604, 609, 177 N.Y. Supp. 827, 830
(Surr. Ct. 5959).
79 327 Mass. 722, 1oo N.E.2d 886 (1951).
IOJd. at 724, oo N.E.2d at 887.
'212 S.W. 357 (Mo. 1919).
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the key .to his intention, 8s2 and that the legislature did not intend to
"divert his provision for his relatives to channels outside the flow of
his own blood."'83 This emphasis on the necessity for a blood relation-
ship is losing ground and hopefully will disappear under the influence
of the majority view.
ANALYSIS OF UNDERLYING POLICIES
The weight of authority today is definitely in favor of permitting
an adopted child to take under an anti-lapse statute. This is a sound
view from the standpoint of public policy. The interest of the public
in providing a workable system for incorporating unwanted and or-
phaned children into society and in giving them all the benefits of
children born into a family in lawful wedlock must be balanced against
any family interest in keeping property in the blood line and protecting
against adoption of strangers to the blood for the sole purpose of pre-
venting a possible reversion or lapse of a legacy or devise. The public
interest is augmented by a desire on the part of the adopting parents
to treat the adopted child in all respects as if he were their natural
child. No distinction is made between adopted children and natural
children in any other respect; it seems unnecessary to treat them differ-
ently as to inheritance.
Today there is less necessity for keeping property within the family
blood ties. The socio-economic structure of the United States is
different from that of common law England. Most wealth in England
was in the form of land, tied to the blood by the feudal system. Thus,
land, for reasons of security, could not be divided, even within the
family. However, in the United States the bulk of modern wealth is
composed of securities and other forms of personal assets, which need
not be kept intact in an economic unit, and which often have no particu-
lar family ties.
The possibility that some people will adopt children solely to defeat
the rights of blood relatives is negligible. Certainly the danger is
not so great as to outweigh the strong policy in favor of giving adopted
children broad inheritance rights. Moreover, if a testator is concerned
about this problem, or feels strongly that property should remain in
the blood line, there is, of course, nothing to prevent him from dis-
inheriting an adoptive grandchild or including a provision in his will
that no adopted persons are to take property passing under his will.
[Vol. xq i'- 55*8,
" Id. at 3 67. 83 Ibid.
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There is no apparent reason to subvert the public interest for those few
persons who can adequately protect their private interests themselves.
CoNcLUSION
An adopted child will probably prevent lapse of a legacy or devise,
either under existing case law, or under the wording of the statutes,
in thirty-six8 4 of the forty-seven 5 jurisdictions with anti-lapse statutes.
The Indiana,"' Pennsylvania" and Arkansas88 statutes are the most
effective from the standpoint of this particular problem because the
answer is in the anti-lapse acts themselves. However, from the view-
point of increasing all rights of adopted children under inheritance
laws, an act defining the terms "issue," "descendants," "heirs," and
"children" as used in all statutes to include adopted children would
be more desirable.
Until the legislatures act, however, the inheritance rights of adopted
children must remain with the courts, which can profitably follow the
example set by the North Carolina Supreme Court 9 in applying a clear
and simple test which will result in broad inheritance rights for adopted
children.
" labama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Ilinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Car.olina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
" The four states which do not have anti-lapse statutes are Hawaii, Louisiana, New
Mexico and Wyoming.
"IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-6o(g)(2) (1953).
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 18o.i4(6) (Supp. 1961).
8ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6o-4io(b) (Supp. 1961).
6Headen v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 157, i-o S.E.zd 598 (1961).
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